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In approximately 80 years, the amount of coffee grown, 
processed and marketed for export annually in Papua 
New Guinea (PNG), nearly all of it from the Highlands 
region1 , has increased from negligible to between 44,000 
and 89,000 tonnes (Coffee Industry Corporation 2017). 
While this still represents only around one per cent of 
total global output, which is dominated by Brazil and 
Vietnam, the crop’s significance for the country’s political 
economy is considerable. Apart from being a leading 
source of national export income, growing, harvesting, 
processing and marketing the crop fundamentally affects 
rural life in the country’s most populous region.
This importance can be understood in part by the 
extent to which households depend upon coffee for income. 
According to the Coffee Industry Corporation: 
Production is dominated by village-based small 
farmers, who produced 85% of the annual crop. 
It is estimated that there are some 400,000 rural 
households in PNG that depend upon coffee to 
provide all or part of their income (ibid.). 
Explaining how that dominance arose and its 
continuing main characteristics is the central objective 
of this Discussion Paper and a subsequent essay to be 
published elsewhere. The latter will deal primarily with 
the post-independence years, when coffee’s importance 
became even more entrenched in the region. In this 
later period, during dramatic price increases followed 
by substantial falls, the extent to which coffee had 
come to ‘imprison’ people, kopi kalabusim mipela 
(coffee imprisons us/my people), became obvious. For 
this Discussion Paper, however, the central concern 
is when continuously expanded plantings reached 
maturity and initially provided ‘the money that grows 
on trees’ (Brookfield 1968) and the early ascendancy 
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of a particular form of production by smallholders for 
international markets. 
Section one of this Discussion Paper shows how 
coffee’s establishment and subsequent dominance in the 
Highlands region was part of an international direction 
that commenced in the 19th century. Capitalism had 
been reshaped in an
emerging global countryside … constituted by the 
technologies of commodification, whereby small 
lots of peasant-produced jute fibres, cotton bolls, 
cocoa beans, and rubber sap were transformed into 
exchange values in European markets (Ali 2018:4). 
Over a similar time period, coffee, too, came to belong on 
the list of major international smallholder crops. 
Establishing smallholder production of coffee in 
PNG after World War II was both part and parcel of 
this international transformation and a later addition 
with distinct local characteristics. Households that 
produced the bulk of the country’s coffee through 
the employment of family labour processes upon 
smallholdings were immediately joined to international 
markets as producers of one of the most important 
traded commodities. This commodity was priced 
internationally in United States dollars, assessed for 
its qualities according to internationally-determined 
criteria, mainly in terms of the arabica (other milds) 
category, and came from bushes grown from seed 
derived initially from imports to the Highlands and 
external to PNG. For more than 200 years, coffee yields 
and the characteristics preferred for consumption 
had been changed, increased and altered by research 
conducted mainly at state institutions in many countries 
before coming to PNG. In short, the coffee grown by 
households in PNG was an internationally-produced 
industrial crop without endemic, locally-derived 
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features. In the Highlands, unlike in coastal and island 
locations, the form of the plant grown was and remains 
Coffea arabica, of less importance for soluble instant 
coffee and utilised mainly for ground and roasted, 
higher-priced specialty coffee. 
With the introduction of Australian currency to the 
Highlands after World War II, smallholding households 
sold coffee for a new medium of exchange that 
displaced previous forms, such as shells. This change 
made it possible for Indigenous growers to increasingly 
rely upon earnings from sales of the crop to supplement 
self-provisioning, often termed subsistence farming, 
and local sales of food crops. Section two of this essay 
details the rapidity of the spread of coffee growing 
and marketing, with an emphasis on how household 
production became predominant.
Section three outlines the central role of the 
colonial state and a particular view of development held 
by colonial officials in Australia and PNG which drove 
the establishment and expansion of coffee production 
(Wright 1999; MacWilliam 2013; MacWilliam 2018). 
This view also placed smallholders at the centre of 
colonial policy, securing the post-war expansion of 
capitalism in the country and the Highlands region. 
Large holdings, most of which were owned and 
operated by European settlers, were allocated an 
instrumental role for this policy. Australian government 
trusteeship responsibilities, supervised through the 
United Nations, were important for containing any 
substantial expansion of large holdings. Of even 
greater importance for the post-war direction was a 
change in the idea of development in which bringing 
development to Indigenous people became central to 
the role of the colonial administration. The post-war 
years were a ‘colonial twilight’ (Timms 1996) and also 
the near-end for large holding plantations owned and 
operated by expatriates. 
The final section returns to the overarching 
theme that what occurred in PNG coffee growing and 
processing from the 1950s until the early 1970s was 
coupled with international changes in the production 
and consumption of coffee. Given the importance of the 
colonial administration for the introduction and spread 
of growing at this early stage of expansion, the domestic 
and international measures taken by government 
officials to dampen the effects of price volatility for 
continually increasing smallholder production of a 
major export are stressed. As independence loomed 
and coffee became integral to Indigenous living 
conditions in the region, the possibility of disorder 
due to severe price declines brought political 
considerations even more to the fore. 
Part 1: Smallholders and the reshaping of 
accumulation
During the 19th and early 20th centuries, a major 
change occurred in the production of many 
agricultural commodities. Large holdings generally 
gave way to and were, in some locations, even 
supplanted by smallholders. Plantations employing 
slave labour had been predominant initially to 
produce sugar and cotton in the Caribbean and 
southern US (Mintz 1986; Beckert 2015). However, 
industrialisation in Europe, North America, India, 
Japan and China increased demand for a much 
wider range and greater volumes of inputs, including 
of agricultural produce, rendering the plantation 
form inadequate. Campaigns to abolish slavery and 
eliminate some of the more brutal forms of wage 
employment also undercut plantation methods. While 
plantation production continued, and in the case of 
PNG, commenced, for some crops, a major shift to 
smallholder, household growing and initial processing 
occurred. This shift included extending cotton 
production to more and more areas of the globe. 
Existing cotton production methods were supplanted, 
and in some countries governments exercised state 
power to force rural households to change from 
self-provisioning to producing for domestic and 
international markets (Beckert 2015:142). 
While ‘until the nineteenth century, in both 
the United States and Europe there were many 
more large scale enterprises in agriculture than 
in [manufacturing] industry’ (Daviron and Ponte 
2005:3, citing Chandler 1977:64), over the next 100 
years smallholders became preponderant for the 
production of agricultural commodities. ('Became' 
is the operative word, for large holdings did not 
disappear in an instant, nor did the near slave-
like employment conditions on many plantations, 
including those which during the 19th century 
produced coffee in Ceylon (Moldrich 1989)). 
Tobacco also became prominent as ‘a smallholder’s 
crop’ (Corina 1975:291). As Daviron and Ponte 
note (2005:8), the end of slavery in the US resulted 
in changes that had a ripple effect across the 
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production of a range of tropical crops. ‘Between the 
end of the nineteenth century and 1920, most tropical 
products switched from the plantation model to 
specialized household cultivation’ (Daviron and Ponte 
2005:8). Later still, from the early 1950s, contract 
farming by smallholders was extended, including as the 
basis for the establishment of banana growing in the 
Windward Islands of the West Indies (Grossman 1998).
This predominance of smallholders continued 
during the 20th century, with Vietnam being the 
exemplary case where state policy and practice drove 
a major expansion of coffee growing. So powerful 
was this drive that by the end of that century and into 
the current one, Vietnam became the second largest 
coffee producing nation (Summers 2014; Menker 2016; 
Research and Markets 2017).
Households also became sites for the consumption 
of industrial goods produced in the factories of major 
capitalist countries. Ali (2018:37–66, 94–107) details 
extensively how from the late 19th century to the early 
20th century the rising, as well as falling, international 
price of jute affected households’ consumption and 
politics in the Bengal Delta. Factory production, 
which appeared as the quintessential form of capital’s 
advance, was joined with household production in 
an extended and expanded form of global capitalism. 
That is, households in occupation of smallholdings 
were capitalised, not as landless factory workers 
living in growing urban centres, but as producers and 
consumers of produce subjected to internationalised 
costs of production and therefore prices. While politics 
and cultural practices, as well as some capacity for 
self-provisioning, growing food, making clothes and 
constructing housing, remained distinct within and 
between countries and regions, international markets 
governed by accumulation (of capital) also heavily 
influenced these activities. Driven by capitalism’s 
‘obsession’ with continuous growth (Altvater 2001), 
primary or primitive accumulation (Perelman 2000) 
also became a continuous determinant of life in the 
countryside globally during booms and busts. 
In Brazil in the early 19th century, coffee displaced 
sugar on many large holdings through a system of huge 
plantations based on slave labour known as latifundia. 
(Pendergrast 1999:22–23). While Brazil remained 
the world’s largest coffee producer and exporter, the 
crop’s spread to other, smaller South and Central 
American countries initially took a similar form: 
slave or near-slave labour working large holdings on 
land forcibly expropriated from previous Indigenous 
occupants (for the case of Puerto Rico, see Bergad 
1983; Clarence-Smith and Topik 2003). Costa Rica 
provided an important exception, where smallholders 
were important from the outset (Williams 1994:44–52). 
While smallholders in Uganda were also important 
from the start, in neighbouring Kenya expatriate large 
holdings were at first given a near-monopoly right by 
colonial administrations to grow the crop. Only after 
World War II, through land reforms introduced in 
Kenya under the Swynnerton Plan, did Indigenous 
smallholders become major growers, supported by the 
late colonial and then post-colonial states (Thurston 
1987; Cowen and Shenton 1996; MacWilliam 2012). 
Coffee’s introduction in PNG as an industrial crop 
followed a similar pattern to that which prevailed in 
other colonies. With seed brought from a range of 
countries, including Java, Jamaica and Kenya, small 
plantings of both arabica and Coffea robusta varieties 
began from the 1880s in Papua and New Guinea 
(Cartledge 1978:5–6; Sinclair 1995:8–29). Because the 
initial development in both colonies tended to be in 
the lowland areas, robusta, which grows best from sea 
level to less than 1,000 metres, was initially ascendant; 
only after European expansion into higher altitudes 
near Port Moresby and the lower foothills of the main 
ranges in New Guinea did arabica, which grows best 
in milder climates, become important. Today over 
90 per cent of PNG’s exports are of the latter variety. 
Most of the early plantings were by missionaries 
(often for self-consumption at missions), international 
firms, individual European owner-occupiers and 
government research stations. 
In Papua, some Indigenous production occurred 
during the inter-war years on the large holdings 
forcibly encouraged by the colonial administration, 
but these were mostly unsuccessful. In 1940–41, total 
exports from New Guinea amounted to 74 tonnes 
(Sinclair 1995:37), and 69 tonnes from Papua in the 
same year (Sinclair 1995:22). While arabica growing 
on an expatriate’s plantation at Wau utilising Jamaica 
Blue Mountain arabica seed was to be a harbinger of 
one direction of the post-war Highlands expansion, 
the 1930s moves to establish a research station named 
Aiyura in the Upper Ramu for experiments into 
growing cinchona, tea and later coffee became even 
more important. 
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Part 2: The establishment and expansion of 
coffee in the PNG Highlands
The first major account of the PNG coffee industry was 
researched and written in the mid-1970s, that is, around 
independence (Cartledge 1978), under the auspices of 
the Coffee Marketing Board (CMB) as it became the 
Coffee Industry Board (CIB). The study shows two 
outstanding aggregate features of the earliest phase in 
terms of acreage planted and output. Firstly, within two 
decades of the first Highland plantings in the 1930s, 
the area planted to smallholder coffee (10,874 acres) 
exceeded that of expatriate-owned plantations (6,842 
acres). Secondly, within five years, once household 
plantings came into production, smallholder output 
(3,972 tonnes) exceeded that on plantations (3,032 
tonnes) (Cartledge 1978:316, Appendix 23). Never again 
after the early 1960s did large holding production exceed 
that from smallholding households.
Ian Downs, colonial official, coffee planter and first 
CMB chairman, confirms this trend, noting:
In 1965 Papua and New Guinean [i.e. Indigenous, 
primarily smallholder] production of coffee 
was 4,319 tons from 35,037 acres compared 
with 3,374 tons produced by Australian settlers 
from 12,229 acres. By 1970 local farmers were 
producing 22,425 tons and Australian settlers 
6,258 tons (1980:185). 
This disparity in output between plantations and 
smallholding households, in which by 1970 Indigenous 
growers’ mainly smallholding households produced 
over 75 per cent of the total, has been confirmed in 
another long-term study. Utilising official statistics 
from the CIB, Herb Thompson and Scott MacWilliam 
(1992:126–127) updated Cartledge’s data, providing 
in graph form the total output and relative shares 
of plantations and smallholders from 1960 to 1989. 
These figures document that the trend apparent in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s continued up to and after 
independence. In 1988, plantations totalling 30 hectares 
or more under coffee, and blocks of five to 29 hectares, 
produced less than 22 per cent of the total coffee crop 
(Bourke and Harwood 2009:549, Appendix Table 
A5.4.3; author’s calculation).
The early prominence of expatriate-owned-and-
operated large holdings producing coffee has driven 
a continuing myth about their importance. The early 
years have been described as ‘the plantation era’ (Sinclair 
1995:66–347) and a period when smallholder production 
was less important, only becoming significant around 
independence (Lea and Curtin 2011:170–71; Imbun 
2014:27). It is necessary, therefore, to provide a brief 
account of the relationship between plantations and 
smallholdings during coffee’s initial years.
Plantations and smallholdings
Coffee was brought to the central Highlands during the 
1930s, introduced by Lutheran missions and colonial 
officials (Sinclair 1995:4–7, 168–177). Favourable 
climatic conditions and fertile soil provided ideal 
conditions for arabica coffee growing. While the first 
Highlands coffee plantings probably occurred at a 
Lutheran mission in Chimbu around 1934 (Shand 
and Straatmans 1974:18), by 1936 Department of 
Agriculture inspector and instructor Bill Brechin planted 
coffee in nursery beds prepared at the Upper Ramu 
Police Post (now Kainantu) (Sinclair 1995:53). The 
next year, Brechin transferred the coffee plants, along 
with cinchona and tea, to the nursery at the newly-
established, nearby Aiyura Research Station. These 
plantings thrived and in 1940, 64 tonnes of arabica 
coffee were produced. Of even greater importance, 
as Michael Bourke notes (1986:100–3), demands for 
coffee seed had begun to come from villagers who were 
showing considerable interest in growing the crop. 
Bourke (1986:101) cites Brechin’s May 1940 Aiyura 
monthly report, which stated:
It is already clear from trials on this Station that 
high altitude [arabica] coffee is going to be an 
economic crop in this area. Local people are already 
asking why they can not start planting themselves. 
Similarly, coffee was introduced to the Western 
Highlands during the 1930s by missions and some 
Indigenes who lived nearby (Dick 1978:1). In 1944, 
the first plantings were made at Korn Farm, a research 
station near Mount Hagen that had been established 
during the previous decade. Korn Farm subsequently 
became the base for extension efforts among European 
settlers and Indigenous growers. These efforts included 
training Indigenous extension officers to further 
increase growing by Papua New Guineans in the district 
(Dick 1978:2; MacWilliam 2013:129–131). 
When, during the Second World War, nearly all 
expatriate women had been repatriated from PNG back 
to Australia, only expatriate males remained to work 
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in the military and related civilian employment. Given 
this gender composition of the expatriate population, 
it is unsurprising that in so many areas important for 
the beginnings of the coffee industry, expatriate males 
were predominant (cf. Eves and Titus 2017b:Endnote 2). 
Some of the so-called ‘expatriate embryos’ from which, 
according to Fowkes (1995:190), ‘today’s prosperous 
Highlands industry was to spring’ were also products 
of the overlap between Aiyura and the Australian New 
Guinea Administrative Unit (ANGAU): males in official 
employment of one kind or other. 
Two such men were Jim Leahy and Jim Taylor, who 
became prominent as plantation owners in the Eastern 
Highlands. During the war, Captain Jim Leahy had been 
farm manager at Aiyura when experiments with coffee 
were conducted. After the war ended, he obtained seed 
from agronomist Aub Schindler at the experimental 
agricultural station and planted this in acreage acquired 
near Goroka. The price obtained by Jim Leahy in 1952 
for his first coffee crop encouraged others in Australia 
to come to the Highlands. Unfortunately for many 
of the late starters, who came with little money, little 
agricultural knowledge and big dreams, the post-war 
peak in prices occurred just two years later, before 
many plantings matured. Later in the decade, acreages 
remained unplanted (see following), funds dried up and 
many of the owner-occupiers who could not find off-
farm employment went broke. Mergers and concentrated 
holdings run by corporations came to dominate large 
holding operations (Howlett 1962). 
Jim Leahy’s brother Dan, acting on his brother’s 
advice, became the first European to plant coffee during 
the 1940s at Kuta in the Western Highlands. Although 
this location proved to be entirely unsuitable for climatic 
and soil reasons, Dan Leahy subsequently moved to a 
lower-altitude, warmer location on better soils at Korgua 
nearer to the growing township of Mount Hagen where 
plantings succeeded. However, even at Korgua Leahy’s 
commercial success did not depend upon coffee growing 
alone: like many of the expatriates who owned and 
operated coffee plantations, survival depended upon 
combining a wide range of activities, including mining, 
operating trade stores and depots for international firms 
plus off-farm wage employment (Hollinshed 2004). 
In both cases, Leahy and Taylor established familial 
relations with Indigenous women when there were very 
few single expatriate women in the Highlands.
The reliance upon multiplex operations, coffee plus 
trading, mineral prospecting and other enterprises as in 
Dan Leahy’s case, also meant that managing plantations 
could fall to female expatriates once they arrived in 
increasing numbers, while men obtained off-farm work. 
One especially prominent instance of this gendered 
division of labour was John and Edith Watts at Ulya 
plantation in the Western Highlands. ‘An intellectual 
and a dreamer … not a prototype of a planter’ (Sinclair 
1995:166), John Watts had no agricultural experience 
and little money. In the mid-1950s, dissatisfied with the 
routines of employment in Melbourne, John and Edith 
Watts left Australia for PNG (ibid.; Watts 1990). They 
acquired leasehold land that was swampy and required 
draining (Sinclair 1995:166). While John Watts worked 
off-farm, including as a book-keeper accountant for 
Dan Leahy, Edith Watts supervised the labour line, 
including men and women, which drained the land, 
planted a second crop of coffee after the first one failed 
and subsequently organised maintenance and harvesting 
(ibid.; Watts 1990). On top of the farm work, survival 
on the plantation required Edith Watts to run a private 
maternal and infant welfare clinic on site (Sinclair 
1995:166; Hollinshed 2004). 
The necessity of off-farm income derived from 
numerous characteristics of most of the expatriate 
planters. Unlike the Papua New Guineans upon whom 
they depended for labour who were familiar with 
farming in local conditions, few of the Europeans were 
agriculturalists, had sufficient personal funds or were 
temperamentally suited to work on their holding (other 
than for the romance of self-employment). Obtaining 
and supervising labourers who did not speak English 
and were often themselves recruited from areas away 
from the place of employment produced continuous 
tensions. Further, demands for return to previous 
owners soon surfaced once Indigenous people — who 
had previously considered the land now occupied by 
expatriates as their own — saw the incomes being 
acquired from the leaseholds (Finney 1973:52–3). 
Much has been forgotten or overlooked in accounts 
which seek to give greater significance to large holdings 
over smallholder, household production (cf. Lea and 
Curtin 2011:170–71). It is useful therefore to briefly 
recount conditions during the mid-1950s, as attested to 
by Yasuo Baron Goto, the coffee expert from Hawai‘i. In 
1956 and 1959, Goto made two trips to the Highlands. 
When he initially came to PNG, there were ‘seventy-six 
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white-operated Highlands plantations covering 14,462 
acres, [with] a little over 2,000 actually planted. More 
than 2,000 native workers were employed’ (Sinclair 
1995:178). His visit was sponsored by two major 
trading companies, two Australian-based banks and 
the recently-formed Highlands Farmers and Settlers 
Association (HFSA). Given the commercial backers of 
the visit and unwillingness to be seen to support some 
firms over others, the colonial administration declined 
an offer to support Goto’s trips. 
The expert’s publicly-expressed evaluations, while 
taken as encouraging by many planters, were often 
highly critical. Goto’s charm, hope and stated confidence 
in ‘your success’ could not hide his recognition that
most of the existing plantations were badly 
under-capitalised, and there was a long-term 
labour supply problem that would have to be 
eventually resolved. Many plantations had been 
located on unsuitable land. Most of the best 
coffee land remained in the hands of the native 
people (Sinclair 1955:180). 
Rather than providing hope, his assessment of 
Kainantu plantations had the reverse effect. 
Baron Goto was not much impressed with the 
general standard of plantations in the Kainantu 
district. The local agricultural officer noted in his 
monthly report for February 1956 that ‘following 
Prof. Goto’s visit … there is a general feeling of 
disillusionment among the settlers, as the majority 
of them are sitting on non-productive land’. 
Goto reported that the land on James Thorpe’s 
plantation was ‘poor for coffee’, as was the land on 
the properties of McBeath, Plant, Burgoyne and 
Hodgens (Sinclair 1995:181). 
Given that Goto was also a consultant for Australian 
banks being asked to provide funding for planters 
invariably short of money capital, it is hard to imagine 
that his reports provided privately to the banks were 
uniformly positive. As already noted, from the late 1950s, 
mergers and acquisitions became prominent among large 
holdings and many of the first wave of owner-occupier 
expatriate planters did not survive or only did so as they 
moved even more into off-farm activities.
By comparison with the small number of 
expatriate settlers, the large Indigenous population of 
agriculturalists provided a more substantial basis for 
the establishment of a major coffee industry, already 
producing considerable varieties and amounts of food 
crops and domesticated animals, especially pigs, for 
household consumption and local trade. Households 
were able to utilise their existing agricultural knowledge 
and household division of labour, topped up with 
advice from colonial extension officials and a small 
number of settlers, to rapidly expand plantings, as 
documented previously. Supported by colonial policy 
which restrained the settlers while encouraging and 
underpinning smallholders, smallholder plantings 
spread rapidly westward from the Eastern Highlands 
into nearby Chimbu/Simbu, where no plantations were 
permitted to exist in a densely populated, mountainous 
area. The further shift into the more spacious and 
conducive Western Highlands meant this last district 
soon became the major source of coffee. By the 
1960s, strongly encouraged by one particular district 
commissioner Tom Ellis, as even more brakes were 
placed on large holding coffee plantings (see following), 
the Western Highlands became the epicentre of 
continuing smallholder expansion. 
The speed at which coffee plantings spread among 
Indigenes was facilitated by other major changes then 
occurring in the region. Trade was the critical solvent 
that undercut and sometimes destroyed previous 
forms of existence, but not trade as had existed 
previously. It was trade of a particular content and 
form, driven by accumulation, over long, international 
distances, rather than the prevailing short-distance 
barter trade, which was the medium of dissolution. As 
Ian Hughes (1978:308) notes:
Exchange behaviour in general, and currency 
manipulation in particular, by the advance guard of 
colonialism in inland New Guinea this century…
was a much more profound influence in the process 
of establishing foreign economic and political 
domination than is usually recognized. In the 
Highlands during the 1930s, transactions initiated by 
government officers, missionaries and gold miners 
during the earliest years of the contact phase were 
arguably the key mechanism in the imperial process. 
The most potent single force was the adoption of the 
traditional medium of exchange, shell money, and its 
subsequent importation in large quantities. 
 
Hughes has documented in detail the characteristics 
of what he terms Neolithic (Stone Age) trade, or, 
more accurately, barter, in which:
dpa.bellschool.anu.edu.au                                                                                                 7 
DPA Discussion Paper 2018/7
Everyman took part in ceremonial gift exchange 
and bartered on his own account when opportunity 
offered: there were no professional traders, no 
merchants, no itinerant pedlars (1973; 1977:203).
Hughes has also shown how these earlier forms of 
exchange were undercut, ‘devalued’, with the reduction 
in the price of shells for exchange being especially 
striking from the late 1930s into the post-war years 
(1978). Routes by which shells came into and then 
circulated in the Highlands and locations where 
different types of shells were valued as a medium of 
exchange and for decorative consumption were altered 
by the establishment of colonial authority. But more 
importantly still, the driving force behind the change in 
the amount and character of the shells was transformed: 
for a brief period, shells became the currency used to 
express the price of labour and manufactured and other 
goods (Finney et al. 1974). This price was driven down 
continuously by the enormous flood of shells brought 
to the Highlands, not by slow, laborious overland 
routes, but by the most modern form of transport: 
aeroplanes. First shown in the reduction in the price 
of consumables, including pigs, wages for Indigenous 
labourers began to be paid in ever-cheaper shells. 
While official currency — Australian pounds, 
shillings and pence — began to displace shells from the 
late 1940s, ‘expenditure of shells by whites continued 
into the 1960s’ (Hughes 1978:317). Convertibility 
(official currency to shells, and the reverse) extended the 
life span of shells as measures of price. Employers used 
the falling price of shells to bargain with and thus reduce 
the cost of employing Indigenous workers, satisfying a 
major requirement for capital’s profitability. However, by 
the early 1960s, 
there was practically no market for shell in Goroka 
… the manager of the leading store in Goroka 
reports that he took all his leftover stock of shell 
and sold it for a nominal sum to a nearby European 
plantation where it was ground up to make shell 
grit for chicken feed (Finney et al. 1974:346).
If the devaluation of shells assisted in lowering 
the price of labour, particularly for plantation owners 
employing Indigenes, a flood of industrial goods 
ferried into the region initially by aeroplane, then by 
vehicles using an expanded road network, changed 
Indigenous household consumption. Previous forms 
of local production, including of axes, stopped (Burton 
1984). Practices involving ceremonies were transformed. 
Exchanges of pigs and brides were increasingly given 
a monetary value, and industrial commodities of 
food, especially rice and beer, became prominent. 
Commodities as gifts (cf. Gregory 1982; Vickerman 
1984), with equivalence expressed increasingly in 
monetary terms, appeared in a major efflorescence of 
ceremonies and ceremonial exchanges (Strathern 1971; 
Meggitt 1972, 1974; Healey 1990). 
As industrial tools entered local consumption, 
they not only replaced previous equipment, but also 
substantially altered socially necessary labour time. The 
time required for clearing and preparing gardens was 
reduced, with an effect that was especially pronounced for 
males as steel axes manufactured in industrial factories 
overseas replaced locally-produced stone equipment 
(Salisbury 1962). The effect upon males in particular was 
further enhanced by the establishment of the ‘colonial 
peace’ that checked, even eliminated, warfare, an activity 
which had previously occupied considerable amounts of 
male labour and time (see following). 
Ian Downs, founding member of the HFSA, details 
an important connection between the European settlers 
and the rapid expansion in the 1950s of smallholder 
plantings. He notes that, 
Settlers established their own nurseries from 
selected seed and gave plants to their Highland 
neighbours in order to establish the existence of 
coffee as a widespread planted crop and to lay the 
foundation for future coffee trading when village 
trees came into production (1980:180).
During the late 1950s, the role of expatriate owner-
occupiers in encouraging Indigenous growing became 
even more important as many expatriate plantations 
faltered commercially. During the period when the 
smallholder coffee frontier was extended further across 
the Highlands, the demand from smallholders for 
assistance from the colonial administration exceeded the 
capacity of agricultural extension services. To increase 
smallholder production in areas proximate to their 
plantations, some expatriate settlers who had come to 
depend upon processing and trading in smallholder 
coffee to keep their own operations afloat were forced to 
become de facto extension officers. 
Initially, some of the expatriate planters also 
provided a further role in the expansion of smallholder 
coffee. PNG coffee is wet processed, as distinct from the 
dry process used in Brazil. Once picked, coffee cherry 
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needs to have processing begin almost immediately, 
preferably within 24 to 36 hours. The external pulp and 
mucilage have to be pulped and separated from the 
bean, which is then fermented and washed to remove 
the last of the external mucilage coating the bean. 
Beans are then dried, usually under the sun. The dried 
bean, known as parchment, is subsequently sent to a 
processing factory for polishing and grading, where it 
becomes green bean ready for shipment overseas. For 
smallholders, coffee is a suitable crop in part because, 
once dried into parchment, it can be stored for some 
time and marketed when income is required. In the 
earliest days — when many smallholders did not 
own or have access to anything other than the most 
unsophisticated equipment for the initial treatment 
process (turning cherry into parchment) — cherry 
was often sold to nearby planters or taken to them for 
processing in plantation factories. 
One downside of encouraging cherry sales to 
roadside buyers for onward transmission to factories 
was that smallholders could hold cherry in less than 
desirable conditions. Processing did not always begin as 
quickly as required to produce the best outcome. Unlike 
in Kenya, where all smallholder coffee was processed in 
centralised cooperative factories at standards comparable 
to those attained at estates, in PNG this did not occur, in 
part for reasons subsequently explained. Attempting to 
improve smallholder quality during the mid-1960s, one 
of the first acts of the newly-established CMB was to try 
to reduce the amount of smallholder coffee that went to 
individual settlers for processing and to centralise this 
stage at larger, better quality factories. However, even 
with this change, smallholder coffee in PNG invariably 
was categorised as lower grade Y, rather than A and B as 
was plantation coffee. The grade allocated determined 
price paid, when during this initial phase there was 
considerable international demand for PNG Y grade 
coffee (Oatley 1990). By the early 1970s, with over-
production entrenched in world coffee markets, the 
declining quality of PNG Y grade reduced demand in 
the US, which had become a major market (MacWilliam 
2013:198). This deterioration added to the problems 
faced by growers and the colonial administration, which 
had so strongly emphasised the importance of coffee for 
development in the region and soon-to-be independent 
country. 
Part 3: Colonial development and capitalism
The role of the late colonial state and official policy 
continues to be misunderstood, not least regarding 
the establishment and initial rapid expansion of coffee 
in the central Highlands. As had occurred elsewhere 
in the worldwide spread of smallholder production, 
much of the driving force behind the shift from large 
to smallholding production was driven by the actions 
of governments and state officials. What makes PNG 
different to an important extent is that the post-war 
colonial regime was never in thrall to the political force 
of plantation owners and their representative bodies, 
who were powerful, even predominant, elsewhere 
(Wright 1999; MacWilliam 2013). 
Nor was there ever any doubt after World War II 
about where colonial policy stood regarding smallholder, 
Indigenous primacy. Ben Imbun incorrectly implies 
uncertainty when stating that:
While the Australian colonial administration 
had not been prepared for the enthusiasm with 
which the Highlanders embraced coffee, it had 
little choice but to support village-based coffee 
production with relevant policy and institutional 
infrastructure (2014:27). 
Although Imbun does not explain what might be 
meant by an absence of preparedness, one possible 
meaning in the shortage of trained agricultural 
extension officers with knowledge of coffee is discussed 
as follows. Here, the more general proposition raised by 
Imbun of a colonial administration with ‘little choice’ is 
taken up. He states that: 
In the case of coffee in the Highlands of PNG, 
its genesis was not an effect of elaborate colonial 
policy aimed at laying the foundations for a 
capitalist economy. Nor was it the entrepreneurial 
savvy of settlers, but rather the result of the 
juxtaposition of gold prospectors, patrol officers, 
environmental factors, luck and an inquisitive 
Indigenous population. The introduction of 
coffee in the PNG Highlands region was largely 
by accident (2014:26). 
This claim sits uneasily with that advanced in the 
first official history by Cartledge, who re-emphasises his 
assessment of the 1950s establishment of commercial 
coffee production in the Highlands:
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The conclusion is repeated that much of the 
credit must go to the Division of Extension and 
Marketing in D.A.S.F. for the rapid and large-
scale expansion of coffee growing by native 
communities in the Highland areas. These people 
were [already] skilled farmers producing a limited 
range of food crops and working on ancient but 
proven techniques (1978:26). 
Michael Bourke reinforces and extends Cartledge’s 
explanation, stating:
The ‘coffee boom’ that was reported as early 
as 1955 was not simply a product of vigorous 
promotion of the crop by DASF extension staff 
from 1953 onwards (or from 1949 onwards in the 
Kainantu area). Antecedent conditions included 
the familiarity with the crop and some very modest 
returns to a few leading men who had planted it 
during the ANGAU [World War II] period; the 
experience of men who had seen the crop whilst 
working as labourers at Aiyura; and the example of 
pioneering expatriate planters (1986:103).
Subsequently, the importance of the colonial 
extension officers has been qualified by pointing to 
their limited knowledge of coffee. Even key personnel 
who played a major role, including Bob Cottle and 
Ron Carne, with formal training and experience in 
agriculture from working in Australia, came to PNG 
with little or no knowledge about coffee. As Sinclair cites 
Cottle:
It’s not too much to say that it was a case of the 
blind leading the blind. We didn’t know much 
about coffee nor did the planters. There were no 
publications on coffee. When I went to Goroka as 
the first extension officer in ’52 I had a book on 
Kenya coffee I got from the department, and that 
was the only coffee book in Goroka, the only source 
of information. Actually, I was sent to Goroka to 
promote passionfruit, not coffee (1955:182).
None of the aforementioned assessments or 
qualifications suggest an accidental origin for coffee 
growing or address the more important matter 
raised by Imbun of the relationship between coffee, 
development and capitalism. The first section of this 
paper demonstrates the international trend from the 
19th century for smallholders to become predominant 
in the production of many agricultural commodities 
central to the global expansion of capitalism. But 
there is no reason why this direction should have been 
followed automatically in PNG, or for coffee growing 
in the Highlands. It is necessary now to show how and 
why colonial policy played such a critical role in the 
smallholder dominance of production and marketing 
of a crop that was one of the most important traded on 
international markets. 
Prior to World War II, there was a tendency for 
the spontaneous process of accumulation, rather 
than intentional development, to be foremost for 
development (Firth 1978, 1982; Gammage 1998), even 
as there were attempts by colonial officials in both Papua 
and New Guinea to protect the Indigenous population 
from capitalism’s most damaging effects (MacWilliam 
2013:24–7). However, during and after the military 
conflict, the balance changed fundamentally to address 
the problem of how to bring development without 
the destructive effects of accumulation becoming 
predominant (Cowen and Shenton 1996). 
Intentional development came to the fore, and 
in the Highlands the production and marketing 
of coffee became the most important means of 
tempering spontaneous (capitalist) development. 
Instead of a negative policy, which would reduce the 
deleterious consequences of private capital, including 
by dramatically accelerating any existing tendency for 
landlessness or proletarianisation, a positive policy 
was instituted. Households were subjected to and 
subsumed by capital while attachment to holdings was 
maintained. As producers of immediately-consumed 
foods and other products, as well as of locally and 
internationally-marketed crops, households would attain 
higher standards of living in part by also purchasing 
commodities. Most of these were produced on 
international circuits of capital, including rice, clothes, 
tools and other implements, and flown into the region. 
Coffee sales became and have remained the principal 
means for households to acquire the cash needed to buy 
such goods (Coffee Industry Corporation 2017). 
This direction, and the objective behind it, was 
well summarised by the Australian minister for 
territories Paul Hasluck (1951–63) after his retirement. 
He enunciated the overriding principal central to 
government policy during the period when household 
production of coffee became dominant, with expatriate 
large holding production instrumental for this purpose. 
He wrote:
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I also thought that we should be cautious about 
building up an urban proletariat or disturbing the 
attachment of people to their own family groupings 
and the compulsions of their own social system 
until we had some prospect that the transition 
to a different condition among various urban 
communities of landless wage-earners could be 
made without harm (1976:131, emphasis added).
The ‘paramountcy of native interests’ policy, first 
enunciated in a 1923 report by British colonial secretary 
Lord Devonshire regarding relations between Indigenous 
Kenyans, European settlers and Asian/Indian migrants in 
that colony, influenced Australian policy in PNG before 
Hasluck became minister. However, he was responsible 
for its continuing anticipatory policy implications even 
as the phrase itself faded from use. As his statement 
suggests, the two essential elements of what was briefly 
termed ‘positive Australianism’ (MacWilliam 2013) 
were labour and land, that is, maintaining household 
attachment and the likelihood of change from a prior 
relationship to a future, urban existence (Wright 2001). 
In the case of the Highlands, coffee produced for 
international markets by labour whose consumption was 
also increasingly commercialised became the principal 
medium for joining Indigenous households to land in a 
capitalised form.
The colonial policy of intentional development 
was not conservative, hankering for a past, but liberal 
developmentalism in seeing the need to recognise the 
inevitability of a definite form of change and prepare 
for it (MacWilliam 2018). Central to its liberalism was 
the emphasis on private property and, in Hasluck’s 
case, small property. During the late 1950s, there was 
a controversial battle over the imposition of income 
tax, which had the most effect on European settlers 
and other expatriates. In an oft-cited statement made at 
that time, Hasluck responded to his critics in a federal 
parliamentary speech:
The liberal respect of property … is a respect 
for small property no less than a respect for a 
large property and … I assert that the private 
enterprise of every native villager is just as sacred 
to liberalism as is the private enterprise of any 
European (cited in Wright 2002:61). 
Developmental intent, rather than Imbun’s luck and 
‘accident’ descriptions for a supposed absence of colonial 
policy (see earlier quotation), was especially pronounced 
and obvious regarding two connected conditions of 
production and consumption. The first was labour, the 
second, land. The first arose because of the effects of war 
on areas outside the Highlands and the consequences of 
the increased colonial authority in the Highlands region. 
Immediately after the military conflict ended, post-war 
reconstruction fuelled a demand for waged labour on 
coastal and island plantations by private firms and in 
the colonial administration (West 1956:1958; Hawksley 
2001:341–342). The establishment of a handful of 
expatriate coffee large holdings in the Highlands further 
added to the demand for labour. Begun in January 
1950, the Highlands Labour Scheme recruited labour 
for employment outside the region. During the 1950s 
and 1960s, the scheme pushed the wage labour frontier 
further and further into the Highlands. Males were 
working in another region of the country, leaving the 
operation of smallholdings to females, children and the 
elderly. This represented the possibility of a return to the 
situation of the 1930s, threatening development as it had 
then (MacWilliam 2013:26–27). 
The problem of imposing the desired form of order 
was compounded by an important characteristic of the 
establishment of colonial authority in the Highlands: 
with the curtailment of tribal fighting, male idleness 
and increased leisure appeared (Finney 1973:11). The 
pool of surplus male labour had also been enlarged by 
the arrival of steel tools, which reduced the amount of 
necessary labour time required for what were male tasks 
in household agriculture, including clearing gardens and 
making fences (Salisbury 1962; Finney 1973:36). The 
existence of surplus males became, for colonial policy, 
the problem and opportunity of unemployed, under-
utilised labour, a relative surplus labour population 
or industrial reserve army (Marx 1976:762–870). If 
households were to be ever more subjected to capital, 
then employing males as well as females in extended 
working days became a central concern of the colonial 
policy of intentional development. Building upon 
Indigenous practices that identified certain plants 
or trees as male, the behaviour of colonial extension 
officials when they held demonstration days mainly 
attended by males linked coffee with male ownership. 
The gendered character of labour power and other 
property rights was often reinforced in the growing 
of smallholder coffee (Barnes 1981; Johnson 1988; 
Dickerson-Putnam 1996; Overfield 1998). 
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Production of coffee for international markets was 
coupled with deliberate efforts to increase household 
production of immediately-consumed and locally-
marketed crops (MacWilliam 2013). That is, in the areas 
of household production where female labour was often 
predominant, colonial policy intended that working 
hours be extended and intensified for women as well. 
New and improved crops, as well as varieties of poultry 
and pigs, were distributed to households by colonial 
extension officers to raise living standards and improve 
health. Both are, of course, central to the capacity to 
labour, a capacity which colonial officials knew was still 
deficient, even more than a decade after the war ended 
(Gunther 1958:49). Although some efforts did not turn 
out as intended, such as unsuccessfully trying to improve 
pig yields through inter-breeding with imported boars 
(Hide 2003:8–10), the intent of colonial policy was 
clear. Women, as members of households, were to be 
included in the objective of raising the productivity of 
Indigenous rural labour. Subsequently, women’s labour 
was also further commercialised in the form of incomes 
from coffee and vegetables (Brookfield 1968:116; cf. 
Brown 1972:90–92; 1995:183; 1999:119–129). Today’s 
empowerment of women (Eves and Titus 2017a; Eves and 
Titus 2017b) was for colonial policy further subjection of 
Indigenous labour to subsumption by capital.
The objective of intentional development – securing 
households upon land – faced another major threat 
beyond unemployment and under-employment with 
too much leisure. The danger arose in the form of 
continuing demands for more large holding land by 
expatriates. If met, these demands would have struck 
at the central pillar of post-war policy: maintaining 
household attachment to smallholdings. The Highlands 
land rush of the early 1950s was an especially 
prominent form of this threat (Read 1951, 1952), which 
subsequently also extended to other areas of the country 
(Timms 1996). In the face of these demands and the 
desire to develop a scheme of smallholder agriculture 
throughout PNG, the administration had to find a form 
of land title that gave primacy to Indigenous occupation. 
Faced with the absence of one single, established basis 
for ownership, when force, first clearance, inheritance, 
planting, gifting and allocation by those in positions of 
authority all justified occupation (Epstein 1968; Epstein 
1969; Salisbury 1970; Feil 1987), the colonial authorities 
invented a unified form of title subsequently named as 
customary ownership (MacWilliam 1988, 1991). This 
form collapsed the multiple pre-existing bases, described 
as traditional ownership supposedly prevailing from 
time immemorial (Anderson 2015), into a new form. 
Customary ownership was expressed initially in 
the 1952 Native Land Registration Act, through which 
the colonial administration intended to develop a 
comprehensive register of all Indigenous holdings 
(Larmour 1991). While little registration took place 
and ownership disputes continued, one principal 
purpose was attained: providing a legal basis to limit 
extensive alienation for large holdings and other major 
commercial operations. Another was to define a form 
of title that barred the use of land for obtaining loans, 
checking the rise of a rentier stratum and landlessness 
(MacWilliam 2013:90–93). This form was, as Hasluck 
subsequently noted, an endorsement ‘without question 
(of) the long-established policy of protecting native 
land rights’ (1976). That is, the ‘basis of smallholder 
occupancy (had) become colonial … state power’ 
(MacWilliam 1991:9). As a result, occupation of land 
by a population who were already agriculturalists was 
secured, and attention could be focused on how to 
increase the productivity of household labour.
Internationalising development intent through 
smallholder coffee growing
Given that little coffee was to be consumed in PNG, it 
was a central feature of the policy to increase smallholder 
production so that it would be tied to international 
conditions of supply and demand, expressed as prices 
set in major industrial centres. While some of the initial 
price stimulus for household growers and the expatriates 
who rushed to the Highlands in the early 1950s came 
from the first post-war boom, this only lasted a few 
years. However, for most of the 1960s and into the early 
1970s, smallholdings continued to increase their output 
and share of total production, which was especially 
prominent in the Western Highlands. Here, an important 
stimulus was the increasing availability of commodities, 
internationally and locally produced, as well as the price 
support provided through colonial state action (see 
following). As David Anderson notes (1977:5), for all 
central Highlands households in ‘the eight years to 1974–
75 the rate of increase in production was 11 per cent per 
annum’ (also cited in MacWilliam 2013:195–6). 
Although the Australian minister for territories 
Hasluck was not sympathetic to the ‘anguished squeals’ 
of expatriate coffee growers (cited in MacWilliam 
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2013:199, fn.147), by the late 1950s the administration 
was concerned at the likely effects of a looming over-
supply on the world market. Efforts were made to give 
PNG coffee preferential access to the Australian market, 
then its main outlet. Given the initial prominence of 
plantation coffee, the action appeared at first to suggest a 
bias toward expatriate owner-occupiers. As smallholder 
output surpassed plantation production in the early 
1960s, the more important target of administration 
concerns became apparent (cf. Stewart 1992). 
 In 1961, the coalition government in Australia 
implemented a temporary by-law to encourage 
manufacturers in that country to source green bean 
from PNG rather than other countries (MacWilliam 
2013:200). During the early 1960s, investigations by 
the Commonwealth Bureau of Agricultural Economics 
and the Tariff Board switched their focus from 
concern with the threat to plantations of declining 
prices to the developmental role of coffee. The 1962 
Tariff Board report specifically linked coffee growing 
to the trusteeship clauses of the UN Charter, which 
committed ‘Australia to the “political, economic, social 
and educational advancement” of the inhabitants of 
Papua and New Guinea. The ultimate aim of such 
advancement is the independence and self-government 
of the Territory’ (MacWilliam 2013:201).
The price downturn of the late 1950s and local as 
well as international attempts to support smallholder 
growers resulted during the 1960s and early 1970s 
in a further irony for expatriate plantation owners 
in PNG. As a condition for participating in the 
1962 International Coffee Agreement (ICA), the 
administration committed to stopping further large 
holding plantings of coffee bushes, even on unplanted 
land of existing farms. No such barrier was or could 
be imposed upon smallholders. When the 1962 ICA 
acknowledged a developmental role for the crop (cf. 
Bates 1997), and local officials pressed for further 
plantings in their districts (Cartledge 1978:85–144; 
MacWilliam 2013:194–6), policy to reduce the support 
provided by agricultural extension officers had little 
effect. In part, as noted previously, this was also because 
plantation owners with a need for trading in smallholder 
coffee stepped into the breach. 
If the ICA agreement favoured Indigenous 
smallholder growers in terms of their relative position 
versus plantations, it was also an attempt to maintain 
overall prices in a prolonged period when supply 
exceeded demand on international markets. While 
the Australian administration lobbied forcefully and 
successfully for PNG coffee exports to be given special 
favourable consideration in the export and import 
quotas established under the ICA, there were also 
important changes made in the colony’s administrative 
framework to provide further support for coffee 
growers. 
By the late 1950s, international marketing of PNG 
coffee was already centralised in the hands of a small 
number of firms. In an attempt to strengthen the 
position of growers vis-à-vis traders, the secretary of the 
Australian Department of Trade urged the establishment 
of a central organisation ‘such as a marketing board’ 
through which planters could sell their coffee (Cartledge 
1978:71). While planter representatives, themselves 
chosen through the HFSA, played a major part in the 
establishment of the Coffee Marketing Board (CMB), 
the continuing rapid increase of smallholder production 
soon made the board more expressive of Indigenous 
household concerns. As with the ICA, the CMB was 
pushed by the 1962 Australian Tariff Board report to 
recognise that there were more urgent tasks than to be 
a marketing firm for PNG coffee. These tasks included 
the promotion of PNG coffee overseas, particularly as 
production came to greatly exceed Australian demand. 
Of particular importance was the following:
A further valuable function of such a board 
would be the stabilization of prices paid to native 
growers for parchment coffee. Lack of stability in 
this respect leads to misunderstandings and some 
loss of confidence in the advice of Europeans 
(Cartledge 1978:73 summarising the April 1962 
Australian Tariff Board report).
At a time when all the main trading firms and many 
of their buyers of smallholder coffee were expatriates, 
this was effectively a proposal that the CMB side with 
households to bolster prices. Subsequently the board 
went further, checking prices paid to growers by buyers, 
advertising prices paid domestically and pressing trading 
firms to promote PNG coffee overseas, particularly in 
new markets. The overall tendency for trading capitals 
to centralise and concentrate rapidly (Kay 1975), in 
effect becoming more powerful in markets where there 
were many scattered producers, was to be restrained 
in the PNG coffee market as smallholder production 
continued to expand. One consequence of the policies 
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as production began to exceed the demand from the 
Australian market was to push the biggest trading firm, 
ANGCO, more and more into the US market (Sinclair 
1995:228–249). By the late 1960s, exports to the US 
exceeded those to Australia. 
There was widespread agreement that the 
combination of the CMB and the ICA, with its export 
and import quota arrangement, had played an important 
part in maintaining prices and supporting further output 
increases, particularly by households in the Highlands. 
When other producing countries, including Kenya 
(Gertzel 1970; Lamb 1974), had been riven by political 
turmoil as governments forced growers to uproot bushes 
and reduce production, PNG escaped unscathed until, in 
the early 1970s, the demand for land, including to grow 
more coffee, reignited tribal fighting (Government of 
PNG 1973; on the generational basis of land shortages, 
see Wilson and Evans 1975).
Part 4: The crisis of over-production
It was noted previously that one of the main 
characteristics of a capitalist economy is the primacy 
of the obsession with continuous growth. From the 
late 1950s, governments in coffee-producing and 
consuming countries grappled with how to deal with 
the price effects of the tendency for supply to exceed 
demand. This dilemma was particularly pronounced 
where coffee growing had become central to efforts 
to make development happen. The favourable terms 
under which Australia and PNG joined the ICA, with 
the latter’s output netted with the former’s consumption 
for quota purposes, emphasised how the continuing 
focus on increasing coffee growing in the Highlands 
had become part of a global effort that was leading to a 
prolonged dilemma. 
By 1968, when the first ICA expired and 
negotiations over its successor became mired in the 
problem of excess supplies, PNG officials were in an 
even more difficult position than five years earlier. A 
permanent ‘structural surplus’ (Cartledge 1978:152) 
had appeared. Recognising that it was impossible to 
limit production, attention turned to arrangements for 
holding surplus stocks in PNG. While the main coffee 
producing countries, led by Brazil, worked to raise 
prices by limiting production, in April 1968 the CMB, in 
concert with Australian officials, increased the existing 
levy on exports to assist building up a surplus fund 
to pay for stocks. The surplus fund was preparatory, 
constructed in the expectation that the underlying 
problem would not disappear (Cartledge 1978:155).
Efforts to increase domestic and Australian 
consumption of PNG coffee, to diversify production 
into other crops and products and to restrain plantation 
expansion were largely insignificant in the face of the 
continued smallholder plantings noted above. Even 
as the mechanisms for controlling country exports, 
through a system of export quotas and export stamps, 
were retained from the first ICA, it became clear that 
the Australian government, the administration and the 
CMB in PNG faced a serious problem, particularly, how 
to finance surplus stock-holding. 
Australia ratified the 1968 Agreement as an 
importer, maintaining the practice of netting and 
extending its membership to include production in 
PNG. No production target was set for PNG. While 
the International Coffee Organisation’s executive 
director acknowledged that any commodity agreement 
‘was inevitably bound to be an imperfect instrument 
for regulating the differences between producers and 
consumers’ (Cartledge 1978:193), nevertheless the 
official position for PNG was that the ‘coffee industry 
fully shared in the benefits of the higher and more 
stable prices’, which ‘clearly contributed to the firm 
establishment and development of coffee growing in the 
highlands’ (ibid.).
By 1970-71, PNG exports to other destinations 
were more than double those to Australia. Calculating 
netting became increasingly convoluted if Australia was 
to remain defined as an importing country. As Cartledge 
(1978:201) notes, ‘A crisis developed in the marketing of 
P.N.G. coffee in 1972’. With stocks already large:
Unless early remedial action was taken confidence 
in the existing marketing organisation was likely 
to fall, followed by a breakdown and chaos. Results 
could then be calamitous for the work of the 
Government in the advancement of the people of 
the highlands (Cartledge 1978:202).
Discussions between government officials in 
Canberra and PNG produced proposals for remedial 
action, the centrepiece of which was overdraft 
accommodation from the Commonwealth Trading 
Bank, secured against the CMB’s bonds and inscribed 
stocks. This overdraft would facilitate the CMB buying 
up to 1,000 tonnes to be held as surplus, with growers, 
plantations and smallholders paid an initial amount of 
60 per cent of the going price. Controls were to be placed 
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on exporters, policed by the Collector of Customs, whose 
officers were required to inspect and validate export 
stamps at PNG ports (Cartledge 1978:205).
The overdraft support was only the first step. Even 
with a further increase in the levy on growers to bolster 
its funds, the CMB would not be able to hold a sufficient 
amount of the increasing surpluses. The Australian 
minister for external affairs asked the Commonwealth 
treasurer for assistance, ‘giving details of the ominous 
situation confronting the P.N.G. coffee industry; where 
“destruction of trees or crops was both economically and 
politically unacceptable”. Instead the minister proposed 
a “holding operation … involving a heavy, if temporary 
investment in coffee stocks”’ (Cartledge 1978:206).
This proposal came during the run-up to the 1972 
elections in PNG, which would lead to the formation 
of the government headed by Michael Somare that 
would take PNG to self-government in the next year. 
In the main coffee growing-region of the Highlands, 
opposition to independence was particularly strong 
(Wolfers 1976:3). Australian minister Andrew Peacock 
would have been well aware of the wider circumstances 
underlying his proposal for a government guaranteed 
loan (Griffin et al. 1979:138–235). 
The loan of AUD2.5 million was to be provided so 
that the CMB could purchase 6,000 tonnes of surplus 
stock at prices close to world parity, while producers and 
processors were to be asked to withhold from sale as 
much coffee as they could. During the formation of the 
Somare-led government in mid-1972:
Coffee buying reached a near standstill in the 
Highlands … as exporters had [already] filled 
their quotas for stamp sales and Australian 
requirements. Two of the major exporters had 
announced cessation of buying and the others 
were only buying a trickle. The main crop was 
well underway to completion of harvesting but the 
greater part remained unsold (Cartledge 1978:209).
The Commonwealth treasury advised the treasurer 
not to agree to the Australian government guaranteed 
loan and passed responsibility on to the colonial 
administration. In July 1972, a one-year loan to the 
CMB of AU$2.75 million was approved, and roadside 
prices where most smallholder coffee was purchased in 
the Highlands lifted almost immediately. 
The local measures occurred after the 1968 ICA 
broke down. International supplies were reduced 
substantially, if temporarily, in part due to a minor 
frost in Brazil. PNG’s transition from self-government 
in 1973 to independence two years later occurred with 
smallholder output at a peak, prices improving and the 
oversupply crisis fading. The ICO dropped controls 
altogether before a different crisis arose: during 1975, 
major frosts in Brazil destroyed crops, driving prices 
to an all-time high for more than a year, and sharply 
changing the conditions for all producers, including 
smallholders in PNG. After independence, the 
continuing dominance of smallholder production would 
be maintained, but in circumstances, domestic and 
international, that were much less favourable to growers 
and the Highlands’s political economy. 
Conclusion
By the early 1970s, the requirement of continuous 
growth central to a capitalist economy had been met in 
the central Highlands through the development of the 
coffee industry. The increase in coffee production from 
33 tons in 1950 to over 38,000 tonnes in 1975 (Cartledge 
1978:316, Appendix 23; Thompson and MacWilliam 
1992:126–7) represents a major quantitative shift. That 
the change occurred through the production of one of 
the most important internationally-traded commodities, 
priced in internationally-traded currencies — US 
dollars, Australian pounds and, after 1966, Australian 
dollars — signifies that the shift was also qualitative, 
by forms of capitalised production. If this feature of 
coffee was most obvious for the 25–30 per cent of the 
crop produced on large holdings, it also held for the 
much larger output from smallholding households. 
Rather than being the principal form of production, of 
‘a plantation era’, once the first land rush by expatriates 
was contained, large holdings came to perform a mainly 
instrumental purpose supportive of a new form of 
household production. 
If the growth objective was met without separating 
the bulk of the Indigenous population into a landless 
proletariat, nevertheless their continued occupation of 
smallholding households became commercialised in a 
form that subjected households to international markets. 
By the 1960s, as coffee prices were affected by global 
oversupply, this subjection required more and more state 
support if a major disruption was to be avoided. Such 
disruption would not have distinguished between males 
and females, with all facing a major reduction in living 
standards as coffee prices fell globally. The imminence of 
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self-government and then independence meant that in 
PNG, international and domestic attention had to deal 
with changed conditions from those that existed when 
the crop was first introduced as suitable for smallholder 
production over 30 years previously. Growth had 
produced another potential crisis of underemployment 
and impoverishment.
With the economic and political circumstances of 
the 1940s and early 1950s giving way to those of the 
1970s, it remained to be seen if the newly-independent 
government could maintain both a growing population’s 
access to fertile, coffee-suitable land and prices that 
could sustain smallholder welfare at levels necessary for 
continued output increases. Yet to come was something 
that characterised the next three decades: the major 
shift against the state’s role in making development 
happen. The political drive for decentralisation that 
followed independence further undercut — and almost 
completely eliminated — any capacity for agricultural 
extension services to underpin smallholder production. 
The early years were soon to appear as halcyon days.
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